https://ror.org/04ttnw109Introduction
This article contributes to Ottoman economic and urban history by examining the wartime transformation of Asmaaltı, a central hub in the Golden Horn region historically celebrated as the “pantry of Istanbul”[1] . This article examines how wartime economic disruptions catalyzed structural change in this micro-urban space, framed within the broader context of World War I and the National Economy (Milli İktisat) Policy. The article contends that the resilience and adaptability of traders—evident in practices such as speculation, stockpiling, and the exploitation of legal loopholes—reveal how economic upheaval can generate new commercial dynamics and reshape local trade networks.
While previous studies have largely centered on the macroeconomic impact of World War I on the Ottoman Empire, this article adopts a microhistorical lens by examining Asmaaltı as a case study[2] . By foregrounding this localized setting, it illuminates the complex relationship between state intervention and everyday trade practices—an analytical dimension often underexplored in the literature. To elucidate these dynamics, the article draws on qualitative archival records, court documents, and periodicals, complemented by quantitative data from trade yearbooks (Annuaire Oriental), Istanbul Chamber of Commerce records, and telephone directories. Together these sources trace the war-related changes in Asmaaltı. Additionally, historical maps and secondary literature help to construct a comprehensive overview of the region’s development during the period in question.
1. Landscape and Formation of the Asmaaltı Area
Asmaaltı was situated parallel to the Golden Horn and delineated by a network of key streets: Asmaaltı Street (formerly Asmaaltı Caddesi, now Kalçin), Cambaz Hanı Street (today’s Asmaaltı Street), and Tahmis Street, which extended toward the Egyptian Bazaar and was sometimes referred to simply as a cadde. Tahmis Street continued through Camlı Han to Hasırcılar Street, forming an interconnected road network that structured the area. Archival sources and historical maps confirm that Cambaz Hanı Street served as a major extension of the Asmaaltı area, stretching as far as Zindan Han, one of the area’s principal commercial buildings. These streets supported a dense concentration of trade, anchored by commercial structures such as Maksudiye Han, Nafia Han, and Kambur Han— located along Balıkpazarı Street and Taşçılar Street, along the Golden Horn.
To understand the long-standing commercial significance of Asmaaltı, one must trace its development over time. The historical roots of the area extend back to the Byzantine period, particularly the founding of the old Venetian settlement in the late eleventh century. After the Ottoman conquest of Istanbul in 1453, the area maintained its strategic importance due to its proximity to the Golden Horn. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the construction of landmarks such as the Rüstem Pasha Mosque, Çukur Hans (Büyük and Küçük), Girîz Han (known as Kiraz Han), and the Egyptian Bazaar marked a period of commercial and architectural expansion. Located between Balıkpazarı and Tahtakale, Asmaaltı became an integral part of Istanbul’s broader hans district, housing numerous warehouses and commercial complexes.
The ArcGIS map below illustrates the spatial configuration of Asmaaltı[3] and its relationship to the surrounding commercial landscape.
In addition to its role in general commerce, Asmaaltı gained recognition for its connection to the coffee trade, supported by the presence of the Tahmishane, a historic coffee-roasting and grinding facility[5] . By the reign of Mahmud II (1808- 1839), the area had evolved into a vibrant urban node, characterized by rice and tobacco vendors, and a barber[6] , reflecting an increasingly diversified commercial environment. At the same time, resembling Unkapanı and Tahtakale, Asmaaltı provided a platform for the Janissaries and their affiliates to extend their social and economic influence beyond military service. Mahmud II’s creation of the Hayriye tüccarı[7] , a privileged class of Muslim merchants intended to rival non-Muslim Ottoman (Avrupa tüccarı) and foreign (Müstemen tüccar) merchants, significantly transformed this dynamic. Traders such as Kahvecizade Hacı Mustafa operated in Asmaaltı, helping to consolidate the area’s identity as a commercial hub[8] . Indeed, the abolition of the Janissary Corps significantly contributed to the establishment of a more secure commercial environment in Asmaaltı and its surrounding areas—spaces where Janissaries had previously competed for influence and extorted merchants[9] .
During the mid-nineteenth century, as the influence of Hayriye merchants declined, the term “Asmaaltı merchant” became synonymous with the region’s emerging commercial identity. Prominent examples include Tantavizade Halid Bey, who was active in Benghazi during Reşid Pasha’s governorship[10], and Yusuf Asım Efendi, the chief soap supplier to the palace. These examples illustrate the extent to which commercial success in Asmaaltı was contingent upon access to patronage networks and imperial favor[11]. Additionally, Asmaaltı’s merchants imported rice from Alexandria and barley from Thessaloniki while entering transimperial partnerships—such as the collaboration between Efrayim Salomon Almalah and a merchant from Swansea, England[12]. Furthermore, the presence of Italian entrepreneurs in the local sardine trade underscores Asmaaltı’s crosscultural commercial appeal[13].
While local merchants in Asmaaltı thrived through political and trans-imperial connections, their strategies—and the structure of the local economy itself—were soon challenged by broader shifts toward economic liberalization and global market integration[14]. This was notably driven by the signing of the Anglo-Ottoman Treaty (Balta Limanı Anlaşması) of 1838, subsequent trade agreements, and the promulgation of the Tanzimat Edict in 1839. As a result, the influx of machinemade goods led to the gradual closure of certain local workshops. Moreover, the practice of selling Ottoman products to European merchants, who were willing to pay higher prices, sometimes led to periodic shortages. Foreign merchants became increasingly active in retail trade, expanding the role of criers (dellals) and brokers (simsars)[15]. As this article argues, these intermediaries had played a central role in Asmaaltı well before World War I.
The presence of specialized piers for unloading goods arriving by sea further supported this economic environment[16]. Eminönü and Bahçekapı served as key maritime entry points for merchandise from İzmit, the Black Sea coast, the Sea of Marmara, and the Aegean islands. Although historically significant, the Hasır, Zindankapı, and Yemiş piers gradually evolved into hubs dedicated to the burgeoning trade in dried fruits and nuts[17]. Additionally, traditional marketplaces such as Unkapanı, Yağkapanı, and Balkapanı—where flour, oil, grain, coffee, tobacco, and cotton were offloaded, weighed, and sold—retained their importance as central commercial nodes[18].
Moreover, Asmaaltı and its surroundings were shaped by nineteenth-century urban transformations, particularly the construction of the Galata Bridge linking the transverse banks of the Golden Horn. This infrastructural development extended the influence of Galata, an increasingly important commercial and financial center, along the Eminönü-Sirkeci axis, further intensifying the economic dynamism of this corridor[19].
The following graph, based on the data published in the Annuaire Oriental (1914), provides a snapshot of Asmaaltı’s diverse economic activities on the eve of World War I[20].
Graph 1 illustrates data on 61 distinct commercial sectors in Asmaaltı, which are grouped into six primary categories: (1) Food and Drink, (2) Haberdashery, Handicrafts, and Household Items, (3) Industry and Manufacturing, (4) Trade and Brokerage, (5) Retail Trade and Services, and (6) Tobacco and Related Products.
According to the data, merchant-brokers accounted for the largest share—15.7% of all recorded activities (35 entries)—followed by colonial goods merchants at 13.5% (30 entries) and soap merchants at 12.1% (27 entries). The existence of hybrid categories, such as “soap and oil”, underscores the adaptive strategies of merchants responding to overlapping market demands. Lawyers also maintained a notable presence, representing 6.7% of all entries, while smaller-scale trades— including tailors, agricultural machinery dealers, and pistachio vendors—each accounted for less than 1%. The prominence of colonial goods merchants suggests that Asmaaltı functioned not only as a hub for essential commodities but also as a marketplace catering to elite consumption. Financial institutions— including banks, money changers, lenders, and insurance brokers—strengthened the region’s commercial infrastructure[21].
The food and drink sector formed the cornerstone of Asmaaltı’s economy. The breadth of products—ranging from roasted coffee, tea, nuts, and dried fruits to Turkish delight, pasta, cheese, rice, soap, butter, and various oils—underscores the centrality of this sector in everyday urban consumption[22]. Although the number of specialized grocers remained modest in earlier years, their presence rose notably in the postwar period, reflecting shifts in consumer patterns and supply dynamics. Artisanal production and small-scale manufacturing also persisted throughout the period. Locally crafted goods—such as wooden clogs and spoons—continued to circulate in the market, pointing to the resilience of traditional skills amid expanding commercial networks.
Furthermore, the trade in packaging materials, including sacks and bags used for the transport and storage of goods, reflected Asmaaltı’s dual role as both a retail marketplace and a logistical node within the city’s broader trade infrastructure. A particularly distinct niche within the tobacco-related sector was the cigarette paper trade. While the paper itself was imported—primarily from Thessaloniki and Trieste—it was processed in local workshops and sold alongside tobacco products. This integration of imports into local production exemplifies the embeddedness of Asmaaltı within broader trans-imperial commercial circuits.
2. Policy Shifts and State Control During Wartime
The Ottoman Empire’s integration into the world capitalist system in the nineteenth century gradually led to a cycle of debt and increasing economic dependence on European powers. Until 1896, the Ottoman economy—shaped by rising military outlays and the growing influence of foreign capital—underwent rapid growth. However, as imperialist influence deepened and the empire’s financial autonomy deteriorated, rising foreign debt neutralized these gains. From 1901 onward, the financial crisis worsened amid reliance on foreign loans and mounting defense costs during the Tripoli War (1911–1912) and the Balkan Wars (1912–1913). By the early 1910s, the trade deficit had reached unprecedented levels, and debt repayment had become unsustainable[23].
Politically, this economic fragility coincided with escalating internal unrest. The rise of nationalist movements and domestic political conflict undermined the empire’s multi-ethnic composition and fueled demands for independence, especially in the Balkans and the Arab provinces[24]. As a result of these pressures, the Ottoman Empire suffered significant territorial losses, compounded by the growing economic and military power of Western Europe. These developments intensified instability in both domestic and foreign policy. In response, Ottoman policymakers turned to protectionism, promoting self-sufficiency and laying the groundwork for a Milli İktisat (National Economy) aimed at restoring sovereignty.
During this volatile period, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) emerged as a dominant political actor in the Ottoman Empire after the 1908 revolution and consolidated its control through the 1913 Bab-ı Ali Coup[25]. After the proclamation of the Second Constitutional Era (II. Meşrutiyet Dönemi), the CUP initially pursued diplomatic resolutions to disputes involving the Great Powers. However, confronted by imperialist encroachments and escalating territorial instability, its leaders ultimately deemed entry into World War I inevitable. The CUP viewed war not only as a strategic and military necessity but also as a means to reassert the empire’s economic independence and reduce foreign influence. Under the leadership of Talat and Enver Pasha, the CUP envisioned the conflict not merely as a defensive reaction to foreign pressure but as part of a broader effort to ensure the long-term survival and resilience of the Ottoman state through economic and administrative restructuring[26].
One of the most critical factors of the economic decline prior to World War I was the system of capitulations, which had long granted European powers extraterritorial rights, tax exemptions, and preferential treatment. These privileges undermined domestic markets and weakened state control over the economy[27]. Although debated since the Crimean War, previous attempts to abolish the capitulations had failed. By the time of the Second Constitutional Era, their removal was a political priority[28]. At the CUP’s 1913 congress, the abolition of the capitulations was declared a “sacred goal”[29], and on 1 October 1914, the state unilaterally annulled them to regain economic sovereignty and curtail foreign interference[30].
In addition, the war introduced profound socioeconomic changes, including the emergence of a new class that accumulated significant wartime wealth. This development was not solely market-driven; it was also shaped by the CUP’s evolving economic vision. In the early years of the Second Constitutional Era, liberal economic policies were promoted to attract foreign capital, resulting in the proliferation of joint-stock companies, often involving foreign investment[31]. However, with the onset of war, these liberal policies were reversed. The CUP leveraged wartime exigencies to implement its National Economy policy, that is replacing liberalism with state-directed economic nationalism.
Yet the emergence of economic nationalism was not merely a wartime improvisation. The negative consequences of the liberal economic policies introduced following the Anglo-Ottoman Treaty of 1838—particularly their role in accelerating the decline of local artisans and reinforcing the dominance of foreign capital—bolstered both public and political support for the emerging idea of economic nationalism. Following the Balkan Wars, the empire turned away from liberal economic doctrines and instead pursued a national economic model inspired by German Volkswirtschaft. [32] The principle of Ottomanism (İttihad-ı Anasır), once emphasized during the proclamation of liberty in 1908, gradually gave way to nationalism. Within this ideological framework, the CUP began to advocate for reforms in areas such as law, justice, and education, and reconcile these initiatives with its broader nationalist vision[33].
On 2 August 1914, the Ottoman Empire mobilized for war and initiated a period of strict economic control in line with the principles of “total war”. One of the first measures undertaken was the abolition of the capitulations. In accordance with the resolutions of the 1916 Congress of the Committee of Union and Progress, held during the war, efforts were made to organize artisans and small tradesmen into Artisans’ Associations (Esnaf Cemiyetleri). The overarching goal was to foster a national (Turkish-Muslim) bourgeoisie under state supervision, precipitating the systematic marginalization of non-Muslims in the commercial sector and the promotion of a Muslim entrepreneurial class. A key component of this process was the redistribution of commercial activities—particularly in the supply of war materials—to Turkish-Muslim merchants, reflecting the practical implementation of national economic policies. To underpin this structure, Artisans’ Associations and joint-stock companies were established, legal reforms were enacted, new banks were created, and measures were taken to nationalize both the financial and credit systems[34]. Nevertheless, the resolutions of the 1916 Congress had limited immediate effect: by that year, the Ottoman Empire’s foreign trade volume had declined to one-fifth of its prewar levels or lower[35].
Wartime policy in the early years of the conflict prioritized military needs, emphasizing the tight regulation of resources and the curtailment of civilian consumption to necessities. Securing Istanbul’s food supply quickly emerged as a paramount strategic concern. Shortly after mobilization, the Commission for Essential Needs (Havaic-i Zaruriye Komisyonu) [36] was established under the supervision of the Minister of the Interior as a tangible expression of the National Economic Policy. This was followed by the formation of the Special Commercial Committee (Heyet-i Mahsusa-i Ticari), chaired by Kara Kemal[37] and composed of representatives from the Istanbul Municipality, the Committee of Union and Progress, and the Bakers’ Association (Ekmekçiler Cemiyeti). The Committee oversaw the regulation of supply chains and commercial operations on the home front. It actively involved artisans and small tradesmen (esnaf), intending to maintain state control over commerce while permitting limited private enterprise. Despite these efforts, the regulatory framework proved ineffective in curbing black-market activity and speculative trade. Over time, the Committee’s credibility eroded amid mounting allegations of corruption and favoritism. Public criticism focused particularly on the opaque sources of capital and questionable investments associated with the three companies operating under state sanction[38].
Further destabilization occurred through the procurement activities of the German company Die Zentral-Einkaufsgesellschaft, which triggered a significant surge in prices across Istanbul’s markets[39]. Grand Vizier Talat Pasha acknowledged that these bulk purchases disrupted the market equilibrium, resulting in a fourfold increase in prices. To address this crisis, the authorities implemented two key stabilization measures: the regulation of exports and stringent domestic market supervision[40]. The former was formalized by the Provisional Law on the Establishment of an Export Committee in Dersaadet (Dersaadet’te Bir İhracat Heyeti Teşkili Hakkında Kanun-ı Muvakkat), enacted on 14 September 1916. This law established the Istanbul Export Committee (İstanbul İhracat Heyeti), which granted export rights to “those engaged in the exchange and trade of goods” (emtia mübadele ve ticaretinde bulunan) based on their declared capital and documented assets. The Committee also issued export licenses, thereby solidifying its central role in regulating outbound trade[41].
3. Speculative Practices and Merchants’ Strategies
Merchants who possessed both goods for sale and an export license issued by the Export Committee were permitted to engage in trade both domestically and internationally[42]. However, many exploited loopholes in the system—primarily by reselling their licenses on the black market or misrepresenting their inventories. The state’s policy of allowing anyone in possession of goods to participate in trade incentivized such speculative behavior. Merchants used state-issued licenses to legitimize commercial activities while increasing their wealth and influence in the wartime economy. This was later recognized in a postwar parliamentary investigation, where Ahmet Şükrü Bey, the acting Minister of Postal Services, admitted that these actions were undertaken with the awareness and tacit consent of state authorities[43].
To regulate exports and stabilize the domestic market, the Ottoman government introduced the policy of “forbidden exports” (ihrac-ı memnu). A decree dated 14 September 1916 listed a range of restricted goods, including essential foodstuffs, agricultural products, industrial materials, and energy resources[44]. However, goods classified as nonessential were exempt from these regulations. Exempt goods included products such as pistachios, pine nuts, hazelnuts, walnuts, almonds, apricots, apricot kernels, dried plums, licorice roots, and gall nuts—as well as acorns and oak galls, used in the leather industry, and materials such as horns and salted or fresh intestines, which various ancillary industries[45]. While staples such as grain and rice were subject to export restrictions, luxury goods, including licorice roots and dried apricots, remained freely tradable. This exemption enabled Asmaaltı merchants to capitalize on these opportunities and further consolidate their economic influence. Indeed, commercial activity in Asmaaltı surged in the autumn of 1916, fueled in part by the arrival of merchants from İzmir, who significantly increased local transaction volume following the blockade of their home port.
Asmaaltı attracted merchants from areas such as Galata, where import-based trade had declined. Amid wartime supply-chain breakdowns and rising market volatility, merchants engaged in stockpiling and speculative positioning driven by inflationary pressures. These conditions created a fertile environment for blackmarket activity and hoarding, which proliferated in the absence of effective oversight. In response, the state—already implementing export controls— established the Anti-Hoarding Commission (Men-i İhtikâr Komisyonu) in May 1917. Despite these regulatory measures, the mechanisms introduced to control the economy failed to achieve their intended goals. Market inspectors reported that some merchants manipulated trade by monopolizing specific goods and engaging in fraudulent commercial practices.
One especially disruptive practice was the widespread adoption of “speculative chain hoarding” (zincirleme ihtikâr). This strategy involved the deliberate withholding of goods to generate scarcity and inflate prices[46]. Rather than being distributed directly to retailers, commodities circulated repeatedly among speculators, with each successive transaction driving up the price. A capital-rich merchant would first withdraw goods from the market to create artificial scarcity. Once the perception of shortage had taken hold, the merchant would gradually reintroduce the goods at highly inflated prices[47].
To combat the spread of this practice, the Anti-Hoarding Commission implemented a series of enforcement measures. However, these efforts proved insufficient. As a contemporary newspaper observed, the limitations of state intervention were increasingly evident:
“It was understood that the anti-hoarding provisional decision was insufficient to achieve its intended purpose and that it was connected to the provisioning decree; therefore, the Trade Committee proposed that both decrees be jointly examined by the Agricultural and Trade Committees, and this proposal was approved by the assembly”[48].
4. Trade Despite the Blockade
Asmaaltı’s growing importance during World War I was closely linked to the blockade of İzmir, which diverted trade flows toward Istanbul’s ports and demonstrated the strategic value of rail logistics[49].
From the early nineteenth century, İzmir emerged as a port city that offered ideal conditions for expanding trade with Europe. Agricultural products from Western Anatolia—such as figs, grapes, cotton, olives, and opium—came to dominate the empire’s export profile. In addition, the integration of railroads, port infrastructure, and communication systems in Western Anatolia enabled the efficient distribution of goods produced in the Gediz and Menderes valleys to both domestic and international markets. The city also became an increasingly significant market for European industrial products[50].
Although İzmir remained the empire’s premier export hub, its economic dominance declined sharply during the war due to the naval blockade imposed by the Allies. This blockade began on 1 November 1914, as part of a broader strategy against Germany, and was enforced against the Ottoman Empire after its entry into the war[51]. Following the declaration of war, the Eastern Mediterranean Fleet— composed of British and French warships, destroyers, and submarines—enforced the blockade along Ottoman coastal zones. The targeted coastline included the Aegean, stretching from the port of Dedeağaç (today’s Alexandroupoli) to the island of Samos, south of İzmir. The fleet’s operational headquarters were based in the port of Mudros on the island of Lemnos, roughly 80 kilometers from the Dardanelles[52]. While enforcement began early in the war, the blockade proved most effective from its second year onward, particularly during and after the Gallipoli campaign[53]. While trade was severely disrupted, alternative transportation routes, particularly the railway network and the Danube corridor, sustained limited commerce following the occupation of Serbia in December 1915[54].
Trade with Allied and neutral countries continued via these networks, though many imported goods were held in long-term storage in international financial institutions—such as Deutsche Orient Bank, Banque Hungaria[55], and Wiener Bank—and shipped gradually. Germany and Austria-Hungary coordinated wartime trade through state-backed companies responsible for the procurement, logistics, and distribution. Istanbul-based banks also acted as intermediaries, warehousing goods in their facilities until their eventual distribution. Neutral countries, especially the Netherlands, played an active role in circumventing trade restrictions. Nevertheless, delivery delays were common due to transportation shortages, and goods often remained in bank warehouses for extended periods before reaching their final destinations[56].
As previously discussed, the Allied blockade during the Gallipoli campaign disrupted maritime supply lines from İzmir. Initially imposed by Britain and France, the blockade was expanded in 1915 with the support of Italy and other Allied powers as part of a broader Mediterranean strategy[57]. For local merchants, the diminished utility of the port of İzmir heightened the importance of the commercial zones near the Golden Horn. Goods previously destined for local consumption in Istanbul were now routed through this area for export, making land and rail transport increasingly vital for sustaining both the domestic market and outbound trade.
Bandırma played a crucial role in this process. Goods from this location were shipped to Asmaaltı and its surroundings through the region’s port facilities, while the railroads, under military control, ensured continuity of supply to Istanbul. As merchants became indispensable to the city’s provisioning, many hired wagons to transport goods to Haydarpaşa[58]. Although wagon availability was limited, the state often prioritized merchants’ requests when allocating transport resources. One notable example of this pragmatic approach was the state’s authorization for a merchant from Mytilene to transport oil from Edremit for soap production for his newly established venture in Asmaaltı, illustrating the government’s flexibility in waiving trade barriers when urban provisioning was at stake[59].
Overall, Asmaaltı attracted companies from İzmir, as wartime trade activity increasingly consolidated around the Golden Horn. A significant proportion of the goods licensed for export in 1916 had already been stored and actively traded in Asmaaltı prior to the war, underscoring the region’s long-standing role as a warehouse and distribution hub within Istanbul’s commercial landscape.
5. ‘To Possess is To Profit’
During World War I, amid widespread shortages and surging demand, merchants who stockpiled goods accrued substantial profits. Ermenekli Mehmet Nuri, a merchant and broker, wrote an article titled “On the Market—What is the Market?” that offers pertinent insights into the categories of Asmaaltı merchants and the trading dynamics of the era. In his classification based on transaction volume, the first group consisted of office-based merchants located in hans, who conducted their business primarily through intermediaries. This group engaged in wholesale trade, operating indirectly by delegating transactions to these agents to minimize direct interactions with sellers or end customers while relying on them to manage negotiations and logistics[60]. Duhani Nazmi Bey, who registered Maksudiye Han as his place of business, exemplified this merchant profile. Specializing in the opium trade[61]—a highly regulated commodity traded in limited quantities—he distinguished himself through meticulous documentation and a formal business presentation. In the excerpt below, he describes himself as a “merchant broker”[62]:
“He engages in the purchase, sale, and brokerage of all domestic products and manufactured goods. He works with order and efficiency, has established connections with Berlin, Vienna, and Hamburg, and is recognized by the banks of our city as a reputable institution with favorable conditions and serious operations. He undertakes deferred sales and export transactions to Istanbul and abroad and provides advances for these activities”[63].
In the Asmaaltı trade system, the second group of merchants, known as “semiwholesalers,” formed a crucial intermediary segment. These merchants operated as brokers for larger commercial houses, facilitating the flow of goods between wholesalers and end consumers. In contrast, the third group, categorized as “small wholesalers and retailers”, typically ran modest establishments and focused on supplying the local population with everyday goods[64].
Most merchants in Asmaaltı belonged to the second group, which became a defining feature of the region’s commercial structure. One illustrative example is the Trading House of Ermenekli Mehmet Nuri (Ermenekli Mehmet Nuri Ticarethanesi), located on Tahmis Street. The trading house specialized in commodities such as coffee, sugar, and “Anatolian provisions trade and all kinds of commercial goods” (Anadolu erzak ticareti ve her nevi emtia-yı ticariyye). On 1 March 1917, it formally launched its brokerage services, setting commission rates of 3% for new goods sold and 2% for used goods[65]. The quote below offers a revealing glimpse into the practices and business model of this intermediary group:
“They purchase or bring in large quantities of goods, which they then divide according to customer needs, engaging in both small-scale and large-scale wholesale sales. They serve specific customers, and the seller and customer know and find each other”[66].
The economic actors of Asmaaltı, many of whom worked as brokers, played a central role in the distribution and marketing of goods exempt from wartime export bans. Among them were figures colloquially referred to as “1331, 1332, 1333 profiteers” or “war profiteers” (1331, 1332, 1333 zengini, harp zengini) [67], denoting those who accumulated substantial wealth during the war years. The prominence and visibility of such figures suggest that the number of active merchants in Asmaaltı increased considerably. This growth reflects the evolving economic landscape, as shifting supply chains, political realignments, and heightened market volatility created fresh opportunities for commerce.
Although systematic wartime records are scarce, the precise balance between domestic sales and exports in Asmaaltı’s trade remains elusive. However, archival data from the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce reveals that, in 1917, 103 bankers, merchants, and brokers were officially registered as active in the area[68]. While the state required merchants to register and provide documentation of consumption tax (istihlâk vergisi) payments, the consistency of enforcement is questionable, given the administrative burden of wartime governance. Despite these uncertainties, trade in goods exempt from export restrictions flourished, drawing merchants from other provinces—most notably İzmir—who rented commercial space in Asmaaltı to expand their operations. At the same time, local merchants trading in restricted goods demonstrated remarkable adaptability. One such figure, Salomon Romano, formerly an egg merchant, transitioned to the dried-fruit trade after the export ban on eggs[69]. He soon emerged as a key actor in the circulation of figs, grapes, bitter almond kernels, sweet almond kernels, and oak galls[70]. The case of Salomon Romano, much like many Asmaaltı merchants, reflects a broader phenomenon in which local economic actors navigated the blurred boundary between opportunism and adaptability. In this context, Asmaaltı functioned as more than a profit-making space; it became a site of economic experimentation, institutional workarounds, and commercial resilience shaped by the pressures of total war.
During the peak of trade in the autumn of 1916, established Asmaaltı merchants, such as Ali Vafi and Salomon Romano, were joined by new participants, including Haydar, Kadri, Nafi and Partners, as well as İzmirli Talat and Duhani Nazmi Bey. All of them maintained a presence in the district, leasing office space for their operations[71]. Haydar, Kadri, Nafi, and Partners not only transported their goods by rail but also operated their own ships to supply Istanbul[72]. The partnership also served as the Istanbul agency for the İzmir Export and Import Turkish Joint-Stock Company (İzmir İhracat ve İthalat Türk Anonim Şirketi) [73], which had been co-founded by Ali Vafi and was officially registered at No. 24, Asmaaltı[74]. Duhani Nazmi Bey, active in the fig trade, listed Maksudiye Han, No. 27, as his business address[75]. Similarly, Talat Bey, another prominent merchant from İzmir, operated out of Cambaz Han[76], reflecting the integration of İzmir-based capital and expertise into Asmaaltı’s commercial fabric during the war.
As with the İzmir Export and Import Turkish Joint-Stock Company, several other companies established representative offices in Asmaaltı during the war. One notable example was the Aydın Fig Producers Joint Stock Company (Aydın İncir Müstahsilleri Anonim Şirketi), which specialized in fig production and marketing. The company conducted its operations through the intermediary company Nuri Aziz, Kazım Nuri and Partners, and maintained a warehouse on Tahmis Street in Asmaaltı[77]. Also, the Karamürsel Fez and Broadcloth Factory Ottoman Limited Partnership (Karamürsel Fes ve Çuha Fabrikası Komandit Şirket-i Osmaniyesi Acentesi) operated in the region through Mehmet Suphi Taşlıcalı and Partners, headquartered in Volto Han[78]. Business records also indicate that the İzmir Facilities Company (İzmir Teshilat Şirketi) maintained a warehouse in the area[79], further underscoring Asmaaltı’s emergence as a strategic node for warehousing, distribution, and interregional trade.
The active involvement of parliamentarians and officials—particularly those holding export licenses and with access to storage facilities—significantly bolstered Asmaaltı’s economic vitality. For example, Kırzade Mustafa Bey arranged the sale of 12,000 kıyye[80] of freshly harvested hazelnuts to Tevfik Efendi at store No. 46 in Asmaaltı, acting on behalf of Trabzon deputy Naci Bey[81]. Hakkari deputy Münib Bey, who maintained a business address at Zincirli Han in Galata[82], was a similar client of Salomon Romano in the natural fig trade. Around the same time, Duhani Nazmi Bey sold 2,500 kilograms of fresh grapes to a representative of Bolu deputy Habib Bey[83]. The most active trading enterprise in the area, Haydar, Kadri, Nafi, and Partners, also purchased hazelnuts from a municipal council member[84], highlighting the intricate overlap between commerce and political office. These examples underscore how parliamentarians and officials leveraged their positions to participate actively in wartime trade. It is worth noting, however, that during this period, anyone who owned a registered trading business and could prove payment of the profits tax (temettü vergisi) was legally entitled to engage in commercial activities[85].
In an environment marked by inconsistent enforcement of legal regulations and limited municipal oversight, Asmaaltı merchants faced growing competition from new entrants. These included emerging companies, small-scale traders, and smugglers, all eager to capitalize on wartime opportunities. Despite rising market pressures—including inflation, shortages, and state-imposed price controls— economic activity in Asmaaltı expanded markedly between the autumn of 1916 and early 1917. This expansion led to an increasing concentration of trade in key sites such as Cambaz Han, Zindan Han, Kuru Kahveci Han, Tahmis Street, and the surrounding areas.
The numerous hans—already embedded in the urban infrastructure—played a central role in this transformation[86]. Ağaoğlu and Partners (Şürekâsı) operated in Maksudiye Han[87]. In a similar vein, Cambaz Han evolved into a full-fledged “bureau/office han” (büro han) [88], where merchants and companies conducted their business in designated office spaces. Individual companies occasionally occupied entire floors, reflecting the intensification and specialization of trading activities. The proliferation of joint-stock companies after the proclamation of the Second Constitutional Era significantly augmented economic activity within these commercial centers[89].
Among the hans repurposed as warehouses, Girîz Han[90], (Old) Papaz Han—likely the present-day Kızıl Han—and Zindan Han stood out. The use of Zindan Han as a storage facility increased notably in the autumn of 1916. For example, Kalpakçı Mustafa Efendi from Bahçekapı used it to store 2,200 kıyye of beeswax, which he later sold to Aron Levi[91]. Similarly, Todori Marika, operating from Hanedan Han, stored 1,000 kıyye of sweet almonds in Zindan Han[92]. İzmirli Talat Bey, a major trader, stored 11,700 kıyye of natural figs in Camlı Han on Tahmis Street[93], and secured a separate unit in Nafia Han for 10,000 kilograms of fresh grapes, which he later sold to Rüştü Bey, another merchant from İzmir[94].
Due to the expansion of trading activities driven by the Export Committee, Cambaz Han was utilized both as a warehouse and as office space. Among the prominent merchant tenants was Ali Vafi Efendi, who entered the soap and oil trade in 1916, partnering with Alizade Abdülkerim under the company name “Ali Vafi & Alizade Abdülkerim”. Operating from No. 25, Asmaaltı[95], they had, in 1915, sought authorization to import olive oil (revgân-ı zeyt) from Ayvalık, citing Istanbul’s “dire need for soap” (eşedd-i ihtiyâç) in their application[96]. In addition to his activities in Cambaz Han, Ali Vafi Bey was a co-founder of the İzmir Export and Import Turkish Joint-Stock Company (İzmir İhracat ve İthalat Türk Anonim Şirketi), officially established on 29 March 1917 to facilitate trade with European markets[97]. Other Cambaz Han merchants included Salomon Benedava, who specialized in the domestic trade of shelled hazelnuts[98] during the war, and İsak Samuel Efendi, who focused on the trade of bitter apricot kernels[99].
To evade official control, some merchants operating from Asmaaltı’s hans registered identical office suites for their business activities. For instance, Room 8 in Cambaz Han was officially registered to both Talat Bey and Salomon Celardin[100], merchants from İzmir who later became significant exporters in the postwar period[101]. Other rooms in Cambaz Han housed similarly coordinated arrangements. Room 9 was used by Müeyyiz Menaşe Efendi[102], Room 10 by Salomon Romano Efendi[103], and Room 11 by İsak Samuel Efendi[104]. Room 2 served as a base for the Sadıkzade Brothers, who operated a hazelnut trade by procuring hazelnuts from Samsun and transporting them via their brother, Ruşen Efendi[105]. The common practice of mutual storage and shared addresses in Cambaz Han has been interpreted in two distinct ways[106]. On the one hand, it reflects a practical response to the demand for increased storage capacity necessitated by the sharp rise in trade volume. On the other hand, it may have been a deliberate strategy to obscure hoarding practices—a method used to manipulate supply levels and bypass wartime legal restrictions.
Inspections carried out during the war uncovered several irregularities among the merchants operating in Asmaaltı, revealing discrepancies between registered business addresses and actual trading practices. One such case involved Recep Efendi, who listed the store of Uncu Hafız Efendi in Asmaaltı as his registered business address[107]. Menemenli Avni, who officially declared the storage of 34,785 kilograms of grapes in Volto Han, also displayed similar inconsistencies. However, upon inspection, authorities reported that he was not present in the building, which was described as “a small building with only a limited number of rooms”. The report also noted that the complete absence of Muslim merchants in Volto Han further aroused suspicion. Likewise, Mehmet Fehmi, who claimed to have stored 11,700 kıyye of grapes in the same han, provided Room 51 as his place of business—although Volto Han contained fewer than 40 rooms, according to the inspectors[108]. These findings illustrate how merchants manipulated official records to misrepresent the scope and legality of their trading operations.
The following excerpt underscores the informal and ambiguous nature of wartime trading practices during the period:
“... the fact that transactions among merchants were generally based on verbal agreements and lacked proper documentation, along with the absence of regular bookkeeping habits among some merchants, made it impossible to determine the dates of the transactions and the identities of the goods’ owners ...”[109]
Although Asmaaltı was widely recognized as a focal point for domestic market operations during the war years, a comprehensive account of its trade volume remains elusive for two primary reasons. First, the Ottoman state imposed press censorship during World War I to mitigate public anxiety surrounding food shortages and supply issues. While the state never officially announced this censorship, it effectively restricted the circulation of detailed information about trading activities and market conditions[140]. Second, the deliberate absence of formal trade records during the war years appears to reflect a state policy that saw such omissions as a strategic necessity—likely intended to shield sensitive data from public or external scrutiny. These two factors—unofficial censorship and the deliberate withholding of data—render a thorough and accurate assessment of Asmaaltı’s internal trade volume virtually impossible.
Despite the absence of comprehensive official records, trading activities in Asmaaltı can be partially reconstructed through two key sources: the 1916 Telephone Directory (Telefon Rehberi) [141] and the 1917 publication titled List of Bankers, Merchants, and Brokers Registered with the Dersaadet Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Dersaadet Ticaret ve Sanayi Odasında Banker Tüccar ve Komisyoncuların Esamisi) [142]. According to the Telephone Directory, 72 merchants were registered in Asmaaltı. In contrast, the Chamber of Commerce record lists 103 merchants active in the area. Notably, only 16 merchants appear in both sources[143], distributed among the following categories: 5 in the food and drink sector[144], 8 in brokerage and general trade[145], 2 in the grain trade[146], and 1 in the paper and matches trade[147].
These sources confirm Asmaaltı’s function as a center for brokerage and commission commerce[148]. During this period, Cambaz Han emerged as a pivotal hub for the grain trade, facilitated by the activities of prominent merchants such as the Sadıkzade Brothers and Bekârzade Hüseyin. Simultaneously, brokers such as Nasri Anti and Sons were also active in Cambaz Han, further strengtening the han’s strategic role in trade. Tahmis Street, meanwhile, solidified its standing as a commercial hub by gaining notable recognition for its expertise in foodstuffs, coffee, and sugar. Kuru Kahveci Han, on the other hand, became synonymous with brokerage and intermediary services. The grain trade was concentrated around Cambaz Han and Zindan Han, reflecting both the spatial organization of Asmaaltı’s trading zones and the demand-driven structure of the wartime economy.
Asmaaltı sustained its reputation as Istanbul’s “pantry,” facilitating both wholesale and retail trade in goods not covered by the war-related export ban. Although the disruption of the supply chains and high inflation hindered trade149, the growing demand for food and basic commodities led to a focused intensification of commerce, particularly in essential staples. Trade data from 1915, 1916, and 1917 indicate that Asmaaltı’s trade activities were concentrated in commodities such as sugar, coffee, oil, olive oil, foodstuffs, and grains, confirming the region’s specialization in these products[150]. This underscores the prominence of grocers such as Hafız Osman Bey’s Emniyet Bakkaliyesi[151], along with Yovakim’s and Anastas’ stores, which served as central fixtures in Asmaaltı. Emniyet Bakkaliyesi specialized in oil and soap, while Hafız Nuri managed his olive oil business. Other prominent grocers included Yozgatlı Mehmet Sadık, Gostivarlı Hafız Ali, and the Hüseyin and Abdullah Brothers, who were all active during this time. Mehmet İzzet Efendi owned one of eight grocery stores identified in the region, located on Tahmis Street. In addition to the grocery trade, the commercial landscape in Asmaaltı was highly diverse. Merchants such as Moronu and Matalon dealt in paper and matches, while Bensal and Orjiyel operated a pharmaceutical supply depot along Tahmis Street.
Immediately after World War I, merchants with established İzmir ties remained active in Asmaaltı’s networks. The Alsancak Store facilitated the sale of various vegetables and canned goods from İzmir and conducted regular transactions with the Export Committee. Among the figures in this sector was Halil Haririzade Abdürrezzak, who became a leading trader of products from İzmir, particularly Bornova olive oil. In 1919, likely in response to stricter regulations, merchants in Asmaaltı were compelled to comply with the guidelines of the Provisioning Committee. This change in trade management, as documented in the official gazette Takvim-i Vekâyi, reflects an attempt to introduce systematic economic oversight mechanisms in the early postwar period to stabilize supply chains and regulate urban supply[152].
During this transitional period, Asmaaltı expanded beyond its traditional role as a center for agricultural and artisanal trade,[153] offering a broader range of goods and services. By the early 1920s, the area was known for affordable clothing, household goods, and diverse commodities, including colonial goods, soap, leather, and hides[154]. According to the 1923 Büyük Ticaret Salnamesi (Great Trade Yearbook), there were 22 grocery stores in the region, reflecting a remarkable expansion of the retail trade in foodstuffs[155]. This period also saw the influx of American products into the late Ottoman[156] and early Republican markets. New commercial enterprises also emerged, such as the Çapa Rice Flour Factory (Çapa Marka Pirinç Unu Fabrikası), which specialized in rice flour and canned goods[157], further diversifying the local economic landscape.
At the same time, modern stores began to appear[158], reflecting Asmaaltı’s responsiveness to evolving urban life. These included a dental clinic outfitted with modern instruments and techniques[159], as well as a store catering specifically to the growing demand for photography and cinema supplies[160]—industries closely associated with the cultural modernization of the late Ottoman and early Republican periods. However, economic growth and diversification gradually gave way to decline[161]. Urban development policies during the Republican era, especially the demolition of historic structures, undermined the spatial and economic coherence of Asmaaltı[162].
Conclusion
The transformation of Asmaaltı during World War I illustrates the dynamic interplay between urban commercial resilience, state intervention, and adaptive merchant strategies in the context of imperial crisis. Long integrated into Istanbul’s trade infrastructure, Asmaaltı, positioned within the Golden Horn trade axis and the hans district of the historical peninsula, emerged as a pivotal node in the wartime economy following the Allied blockade of İzmir. Its existing network of hans, warehouses, and trading offices enabled the area to absorb logistical shocks and reassert its economic relevance. This shift occurred not in isolation but in response to—and in negotiation with—the Ottoman state’s wartime economic interventions, including price controls, anti-hoarding decrees, export bans, and licensing regulations implemented under the National Economy Policy. While these measures aimed to stabilize domestic markets and bolster a nascent Turkish-Muslim entrepreneurial class, they also unintentionally created space for speculative practices such as chain hoarding, layered storage, and license trading. Nonetheless, despite state efforts to prioritize specific demographic groups, Asmaaltı preserved a notable degree of pluralism, enabling merchants such as Salomon Romano, Yovakim, and Anastas to continue their operations.
Merchants in Asmaaltı responded with agility, developing informal practices that navigated regulatory ambiguities while maintaining commercial continuity. Moreover, Asmaaltı’s specialization in goods exempt from export restrictions— such as figs, olive oil, and dried fruits—enhanced its wartime appeal, particularly for traders from İzmir and in general from the Aegean region. The area effectively functioned as a domestic trading port within the capital during a period of constrained international commerce. Parliamentary representatives and municipal officials reinforced this transformation by mediating between formal governance structures and commercial actors, thereby expanding economic possibilities while entrenching structural inequalities.
In conclusion, Asmaaltı—positioned at the intersection of shifting state policies, urban space, and merchant initiative—offers a window into the commercial resilience of the late Ottoman Empire. Far from occupying a marginal or static position, Asmaaltı recalibrated its function through a blend of strategic flexibility, political negotiation, and pragmatic adaptation. In this sense, the case of Asmaaltı invites us to reconsider how micro-urban economies weather periods of upheaval—not as peripheral recipients of change, but as active sites where the terms of survival, agency, and governance are continually being redefined.