VI. Sultan Mehmet Vahidettin tahta çıkışından (4 Temmuz 1918) kaçmasına kadar (17 Kasım 1922) İngiltere Hükümetiyle arasında bir anlaşma olanağını imgelemekte idi. İstanbul’daki Yüksek Komiserlerinin çok soğuk davranmasına bakmıyarak talebinin iyilikle incelenmesi için oradan ricada bulunmaktan vazgeçmiyordu. Bu isteği iki kez antlaşma teklifi şekline soktu:
1 — 30 Mart 1919: Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919- 1939, First Series, Vol. IV, No. 507[1],
2 — 25 Mart 1922: Bilâl N. Şimşir, Documents on British Foreign Policy’de bulunmayan bu önemli vesikayı Public Record Officc’te bulup “İngiliz Belgeleriyle Sakarya’dan İzmir’e (1921-1922)” adlı kitabında[2] tercümesini bastırmakla hizmette bulunmuştur. Foreign and Commonwealth Office’in müsaadesiyle orijinal metni ilk olarak burada yayınlanmıştır.
British High Commission, Constantinople, 26th March 1922.
No. 304.
SECRET;
My Lord,
The Grand Vizier called on me yesterday.
2. His Highness began by referring to a conversation he had had with Your Lordship at the time of the Conference in London in March of last year. On that occasion he had stated that the Sultan was anxious to conclude a separate agreement with England. The Grand Vizier had recognised that such a solution was not practicable at that moment and Your Lordship had agreed that it was not possible for His Majesty's Government to take separate action from their Allies at that juncture. The conversation in question is recorded in Your Lord-ship's despatch No. 240 of March 15, 1921. (cf. Documents, Vol. XVII, No. 50).
3. The Grand Vizier then informed me that the Sultan had sent for him yesterday and that he had proceeded to the Palace after the Cabinet Council. The Sultan had then unfolded to him the following proposal which His Majesty had instructed him to communicate to me, with the request that I would lay it before Your Lordship. The proposal is to the following effect: — That an agreement should be concluded between England and Turkey under which the latter would entrust to England the maintenance of the liberty of the Straits in the interest impartially of all nations. England could either use her own troops for the purpose or Turkish Gendarmerie which would be put at her disposal by the Turkish Government and would be under her orders. In fact the administration of the strip of territory necessary to ensure the maintenance of the freedom of the Straits would be vested in British hands.
4. The Sultan thought that such an agreement would remove the objection to the return to Turkey of Eastern Thrace and Adrianople, since England being invested with the guardianship of the
The Right Honourable,
The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, K.G., P.C.,
etc., etc., etc.
Straits on behalf of all nations, would have nothing to fear in the future. Such an agreement would once and for all destroy the idea prevailing in India and elsewhere that England is hostile to the Caliphate and wishes to destroy Turkey. The agreement would be a striking proof of the contrary and would proclaim to the Moslem world the fact that England was the associate or the protector of the Caliphate.
5. The Grand Vizier went on to say that he quite realised that the Allies had bound themselves not to conclude separate agreements with Turkey. To meet this objection the Sultan had recalled the fact that at the time of the Congress of Berlin, Great Britain had been given Cyprus in return for a guarantee of the protection of Asia Minor against Russian interference. This arrangement had been negotiated directly between England and Turkey without the cognizance of the other Powers and had, he thought, been communicated to the Conference whilst it was sitting. The Sultan had also referred to the policy of England in Egypt. The basis of this policy had been and would continue to be the determination to keep open British communications with the East through the Suez Canal. This object had been achieved and the Egyptians had at the same time secured their complete independence. His Majesty did not see why the same results should not be obtained in the case of the Straits. The freedom of the Straits was of the utmost importance to British interests. England, therefore, could be entrusted with the maintenance of that freedom which need not interfere with the full independence of Turkey. The Sultan considered that of all the Powers, England was the most farseeing,
6. The Grand Vizier said that he was in agreement with the proposal which His Majesty had put forward. He had reflected over this proposal all night and had come to me today to ask me to transmit it to Your Lordship. The Sultan had impcressed on him the necessity of secrecy in this matter and had even asked him not to mention this proposal to the other Turkish Ministers not excepting Izzet Pasha. He hoped, therefore, that Your Lordship would treat this matter equally confidentially and not communicate the proposal to the French or Italians. Finally His Majesty had declared that if an agreement on the lines indicated could be reached with England he would sign and ratify it at once.
7. I listened to the Grand Vizier’s statement with great attention and at the end of it I thanked him for it as well as for the confidence which the Sultan seemed willing to repose in my country. But I thought it only right to remind His Highness of the criticism which the action of France in concluding the Franco-Kemalist agreement behind the backs of her Allies had aroused on the part of British public opinion. Was not the Sultan asking us to contemplate an action similar to that for which we had blamed the French? The Grand Vizier replied that the circumstances were not quite similar. The Franco-Kemalist agreement had done great harm; it had made the Kemalists arrogant and intractable. An agreement with England such as the Sultan had suggested would on the contrary be to the benefit of the whole world. I replied that I thought that it would tend to rouse jealousy on the part of the Allies. I also asked the Grand Vizier how the Nationalists would view such an agreement. He replied that they could not possibly object to it, especially if it resulted in the return to Turkey of Eastern Thrace with Adrianople.
8. In speaking as he did of the Franco-Kemalist agreement, it is clear that the Grand Vizier was largely animated by the resentment felt by the Sultan and possibly himself, at having been side- - tracked in this matter. Whilst I see the obvious objections to the proposal made by the Sultan, I think it would be a mistake to look upon it merely as a device in accordance with Turkish policy to separate the Allies. I believe the Sultan to be sincerely imbued with the desire for close relations with England. He has never made any secret of this desire. He notes the close relations at present existing between France and Angora and he is afraid of the extent to which Mustafa Kemal has committed himself to the Soviet Government. He foresees the moment when the Nationalists will be free to come to Constantinople bringing with them perhaps their commitments both to France and to Soviet Russia. He looks about for a protector and he instinctively turns to England. I, therefore, hope that whatever reply Your Lordship may see fit to return to the Sultan’s proposal, and the Sultan will expect a reply, it will if it is a refusal, be made as palatable as possible to the Sultan and his Government.
9. Before he left, the Grand Vizier told me that the Sultan had often felt the irksomness of having to converse with me through an interpreter. If he could talk English or French, His Majesty would open his mind much more freely to me.
I have the honour to be,
My Lord,
With the highest respect,
Your Lordship’s most obedient,
humble Servant,
(sig.) Horace Rumbold
High Commissioner
Zweites Vertragsangebot Mehmeds VI. an England
VON GOTTHARD JÄSCHKE
Sultan Mehmed VI. Vahidettin träumte von seiner Thronbe-steigung (4. Juli 1918) bis zu seiner Flucht (17. November 1922) von der Möglichkeit einer Verständigung zwischen ihm und der britischen Regierung. Trotz aller kühlen Zurückhaltung der High Commissioners in Istanbul war er nicht davon abzubringen, sic um wohlwollende Prüfung seiner Angebote zu bitten. Diese kleidete er zweimal in formelle Vertragsvorschläge:
1 —30. März 1919: Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, First Series, Vol. IV, No. 507[1],
2 — 25. März 1922: Bilâl N. Şimşir hat sich das Verdienst erworben, dieses wichtige Dokument, das in den veröffentlichten Bänden des Foreign Office nicht enthalten ist, im Public Record Office entdeckt und übersetzt zu haben: “İngiliz Belgeleriyle Sakarya’dan İzmir’e kadar” (Von der Sakaryaschlacht bis zur Befreiung von İzmir im Lichte der britischen Urkunden)[2].
Mit Genehmigung des Foreign and Commonwealth Office wird hier der Originaltext erstmalig wiedergegeben.